Schedule
This schedule is subject to change as the semester progresses, but it will be kept up to date. Slides are linked from the lecture title. They will be made available on the day of the lecture.
Part 1: Game theory
Date | Topic | Readings & Milestones |
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Tue, Jan 8 | Course overview | |
Thu, Jan 10 | Utility theory | S&LB §3.1 |
Tue, Jan 15 | Game theory intro | S&LB §3.2–3.3.3 |
Thu, Jan 17 | Further solution concepts | S&LB §3.4 Add/Drop deadline Jan 18 |
Tue, Jan 22 | Further solution concepts & Computational issues | S&LB §3.4.5, 3.4.7, 4.1, 4.2.3, 4.6, Appendix B Assignment 1 released |
Thu, Jan 24 | Perfect-information extensive form games | S&LB §5.1 |
Tue, Jan 29 | Imperfect-information extensive form games | S&LB §5.2–5.2.2 |
Thu, Jan 31 | Repeated games | S&LB §6.1 |
Tue, Feb 5 | Bayesian games | S&LB §6.3 Assignment 1 due |
Thu, Feb 7 | Risk Aversion & Social choice | S&LB §9.0–9.4 (excluding Arrow’s Theorem proof) |
Tue, Feb 12 | Mechanism design | S&LB §10.0–10.4.2 |
Thu, Feb 14 | Midterm exam | Assignment 2 released Feb 15 |
Winter Reading Break, NO CLASS | ||
Winter Reading Break, NO CLASS |
Part 2: Behavioural game theory
Date | Topic | Readings & Milestones |
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Tue, Feb 26 | Behavioural economics intro | Kahneman & Tversky (1979) |
Thu, Feb 28 | Experimental design; presentation scheduling | Mason & Suri (2012) Kneeland (2015) Survey outlines due |
Tue, Mar 5 | Single-shot interactions | Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) McKelvey & Palfrey (1995) Optional: Wright & Leyton-Brown (2017) Assignment 2 due |
Thu, Mar 7 | Salience and focal points | Crawford & Iriberri (2007) Burchardi and Penczynski (2014) Optional: Wright & Leyton-Brown (2019) |
Tue, Mar 12 | Fairness and social preferences | Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) Gal, Mash, Procaccia, and Zick (2017) Assignment 3 released |
Thu, Mar 14 | Repeated interactions | Camerer & Ho (1999) Chen, Liu, Chen, and Lee (2011) Optional: Erev, Ert, Plonsky, Cohen, and Cohen, (2017) (Google Drive) |
Tue, Mar 19 | No-regret learning | Hart & Mas-Colell (2000) Nekipelov, Syrgkanis, and Tardos (2015) |
Thu, Mar 21 | Data-driven macroeconomic prediction (*) | Wu & Brynjolfsson (2015) |
Part 3: Research surveys
Date | Presentations | Milestones |
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Tue, Mar 26 | (1) Michele: Fairness (2) Zaheen: Disparity in Strategies Between Humans and Rational Agents in Curling |
Assignment 3 due |
Thu, Mar 28 | (1) Daniel: Tragedy of the Commons (2) Abhishek: Game Theory and Voter Turnout |
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Tue, Apr 2 | (1) Amir: Game Theory for Morality (2) Leticia: The Role of Deception in Games |
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Thu, Apr 4 | (1) Ayantha: Game Theoretical Approaches to Handling Road Traffic (2) Josh: Differential Privacy in Mechanism Design |
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Tue, Apr 9 | (1) Touqir: Multi-Armed Bandit Algorithms for Strategic Agents (2) Maryam: Confidence in Value Based Decision-Making |
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Wed, Apr 10 | NO CLASS | Peer reviews due |
Thu, Apr 11 | NO CLASS | Research survey due |