

# Course Overview

CMPUT 654:  
Modelling Human Strategic Behaviour

# Strategic Modelling

This course is about modelling human strategic behaviour:

- **Modelling:** Constructing formal, predictive models of action
- **Strategic:** Outcomes that an agent cares about depend on:
  1. Agent's **own** actions
  2. Actions of **other** agents, with **independent** goals and priorities
- **Human:** Primarily concerned with modelling behaviour by **people**, not by algorithms (e.g., border gateway protocol)
  - Actual, **empirical** behaviour, not **ideal** behaviour

# Framework

This course uses three main tools:

1. Game theory
2. Behavioural Game Theory
3. Data
4. Machine learning

# 1. Game Theory

- Solution concepts follow from **assumptions**
- We use the **representations and models** of game theory, usually not **solution concepts**
- Need to know the solution concepts anyway!
  - Interpretation of solutions and models
  - Understanding differences from the standard model

# 2. Behavioural Game Theory

- **Inductive** models, not just implications of assumptions
- Models are typically cognitively inspired
- Standard behavioural game theory often aims to **explain anomalies**
  - We'll take a much more **predictive** approach
- Much less conceptually unified than standard game theory

# 3. Data

## **Experimental data**

- Most existing behavioural research
- Old-school: In-person experiments, small  $n$
- Recent: often Mechanical Turk

## **Field data**

- Rare but out there
- Much more exciting for ML modelling

# Lecture Outline

1. Overview
2. Logistics
3. Course Topics
4. Introductions

# Course Essentials

**Course webpage:** [jrwright.info/bgtcourse/](http://jrwright.info/bgtcourse/)

- This is the **main source** for information about the class
- Slides, readings, assignments, deadlines

**Contacting me:**

- Discussion board: [piazza.com/ualberta.ca/winter2019/cmput654/](https://piazza.com/ualberta.ca/winter2019/cmput654/) for **public** questions about assignments, lecture material, etc.
- Email: [james.wright@ualberta.ca](mailto:james.wright@ualberta.ca) for **private** questions (health problems, inquiries about grades)
- Office hours: After every lecture, or by appointment

# Prerequisites

- Prior knowledge of game theory is **NOT REQUIRED**
- Need to be able to follow/construct formal **proofs** and **mathematical arguments**
- Basic knowledge of **probability** (random variables, expectations, conditional probability, Bayes' rule)

# Evaluation

## Grade breakdown

- Assignments: 30%
- Midterm exam: 25%
- Research survey: 20%
- Survey presentation: 15%
- Survey peer review: 10%

## Late assignments

- 20% deducted per day

## Missed assignments or exams

- **Provide a note** from doctor, academic advisor, etc.
- Assignments score will be **reweighted** to exclude missed assignments
- If the midterm exam is missed, the marks from the **research survey** and **assignments** will be used in its place
  - i.e., grade will be 42.5% assignments, 57.5% research survey

# Assignments

There will be **three** assignments (not weighted equally)

You are **encouraged to discuss** assignment questions with other students:

1. You **may not** share or look at each other's **written work**
2. You must **write up** your solutions individually
3. You must **list** everyone you talked with about the assignment.

# Research survey

Final part of the class is driven by a small **research project**

- Survey of literature of sub-area we did not cover in class
  - Could be an **application** area, specific **subset** of an area we did cover,
  - Ideally: Propose direction for **new research** (especially if you are considering working with me)
  - Novel research results **NOT REQUIRED** (but may get bonus marks)
- Deliverables:
  1. One-page outline
  2. Presentation to class
  3. Peer review of others' presentations
  4. Survey paper
- Can work in **groups**
  - Individually is better if you are considering working with me

# Academic Conduct

- Submitting someone else's work as your own is **plagiarism**.
- So is helping someone else to submit your work as their own.
- I report **all cases** of academic misconduct to the university.
- The university takes academic misconduct **very seriously**.  
Possible consequences:
  - Zero on the assignment or exam (virtually guaranteed)
  - Zero for the course
  - Permanent notation on transcript
  - Suspension or expulsion from the university

# Readings

## **For Part 1 (Game theory)**

- Yoav Shoham and Kevin Leyton-Brown,  
Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations

## **For Part 2 (Behavioural game theory):**

- Original papers from the literature
- Possibly lecture notes-style summaries

## **For Part 3 (Research surveys):**

- Self-directed readings from the literature
  - But feel free to ask me for pointers!

# Enrollment

**How many people present today are:**

- Enrolled?
- Auditing with the hope of enrolling?
- Auditing without intending to enrol?

# Course Topics

## Game theory

Date	Topic	Readings & Milestones
Tue, Jan 8	Course overview	
Thu, Jan 10	Utility theory	<a href="#">S&amp;LB</a> §3.1
Tue, Jan 15	Game theory intro	<a href="#">S&amp;LB</a> §3.2–3.3.3
Thu, Jan 17	Mixed strategies	<a href="#">S&amp;LB</a> §3.2–3.3.3 Add/Drop deadline Jan 18
Tue, Jan 22	Alternative solution concepts	<a href="#">S&amp;LB</a> §3.4 Assignment 1 released
Thu, Jan 24	Perfect-information extensive-form games	<a href="#">S&amp;LB</a> §5.1
Tue, Jan 29	Imperfect-information extensive-form games	<a href="#">S&amp;LB</a> §5.2–5.2.2
Thu, Jan 31	Repeated games	<a href="#">S&amp;LB</a> §6.1
Tue, Feb 5	Bayesian games	<a href="#">S&amp;LB</a> §6.3 Assignment 1 due
Thu, Feb 7	Social choice	<a href="#">S&amp;LB</a> §9.0–9.4 (excluding Arrow's Theorem proof)
Tue, Feb 12	Mechanism design	<a href="#">S&amp;LB</a> §10.0–10.2 Assignment 2 released
Thu, Feb 14	Midterm exam	

## Behavioural game theory

Date	Topic	Readings & Milestones
Tue, Feb 26	Behavioural economics intro	Assignment 2 due
Thu, Feb 28	Experimental design; presentation scheduling	Survey outlines due
Tue, Mar 5	Single-shot interactions	
Thu, Mar 7	Saliency and focal points	
Tue, Mar 12	Fairness and social preferences	Assignment 3 released
Thu, Mar 14	Repeated interactions	
Tue, Mar 19	No-regret learning	
Thu, Mar 21	Behavioural macroeconomics/finance (*)	

## Research surveys

Date	Milestones
Tue, Mar 26	Assignment 3 due
Thu, Mar 28	
Tue, Apr 2	
Thu, Apr 4	
Tue, Apr 9	
Thu, Apr 11	Research survey due

# Survey Topics

The ideal project is a **proposal** for novel work and a survey of the relevant **related work**

## 1. Predictive Models

- Feedback and Dynamic Behaviour
- Interpretability
- Characterizing Nonstrategic Behaviour
- Robust Learning in Continuous Domains

## 2. Agent Design

- Game Play
- Strategic Malware Detection
- Behavioural Macroeconomic Forecasting

## 3. Policy Design

- Peer Grading Platforms
- Misinformation in Social Networks
- Traffic Optimization

# Introductions

Let's get to know each other!

Each person in the room, please introduce yourself by telling us:

- Your name
- Your academic background (undergrad, current year, etc.)
- What you work on or hope to work on in your research
- Why you are taking the class
- Anything else that you'd like us to know

# ABGT Reading Group

Topics related to algorithmic and behavioural game theory

Approximately 60-90 minutes per week

Starting in late January

Webpage: [jrwright.info/abgt.html](http://jrwright.info/abgt.html)

Email me if you are interested in participating!

# Summary

- **Course webpage:** [jrwright.info/bgtcourse/](http://jrwright.info/bgtcourse/)
- Data-driven behavioural modelling using lens of **game theory**
- Research survey
- Reading group: [jrwright.info/abgt.html](http://jrwright.info/abgt.html)