# Game Theory for Morality

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How can
Game Theory
be used in
Moral Philosophy?

# What we are going to discuss

- [0] Some History
- [1] Functionalism
- [2] Contractarianism
- [3] Evolutionary GT



Richard B. Braithwaite

"Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher" 1955

"Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour" 1944



Von Neumann & Morgenstern

"The bargaining problem" 1950



John F. Nash

"Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher"

1955



R. B. Braithwaite

#### Cool GT Timeline:

http://euler.fd.cvut.cz/pred
mety/teorie her/histf.html



Thomas **Hobbes** 1588 - 1679



David **Hume** 1711 - 1776



Richard B. Braithwaite

His prediction hasn't yet happened:(









#### Bruno Verbeek 2002

- [1] Functionalism
- [2] Contractarianism
- [3] Evolutionary GT

# 1st approach Functionalism



#### Edna Ullmann-Margalit

# 1977 The Emergence of Norms

moral norms enable agents to cooperate and coordinate their actions in situations where the pursuit of self-interest prevents this.



**Edna Ullmann-Margalit**The Emergence of Norms 1977

#### Artillerist #2

Artillerist #1

	stay		flee	
stay		2		3
	2		0	
flee		0		1
	3		1	



#### The solution?

- Chain each other to the guns

**Morality** commits agents to avoid Pareto-inefficient or sub-optimal outcomes.

# 1. Functionalism The Problems:

- It does not explain the emergence and persistence of morality
- We don't know if morality coincides with the Pareto-superior outcomes.
- It assumes the conflict of morality with individual rationality





- 2. Contractarianism
- 3. Evolutionary GT




Bruno Verbeek 2002

# 2nd approach Contractarianism

#### Morality as a Bargaining Process:

Rational agents in a suitably idealised bargaining situation will agree on a specific distribution of benefits of cooperation.

#### The Artillerists Bargaining



#### What would the distribution be?

- Cooperative game theory
- Non-cooperative game theory



**David Gauthier** 

Morals by Agreement 1986

Tries to answer "why be Moral?"



#### **David Gauthier**

# 1986 Morals by Agreement

- Constrained maximisation
- Disposition to cooperate with other cooperators

# 3rd approach Evolutionarygametheorianism

#### Differences:

- Morality is a side-effect of interactions of agents
- It emerges from repeated interactions of small groups
- Not assuming full information and full rationality



Jean-Jacques Rousseau

1754

Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes A Discourse Upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality Among Mankind

#### > Stag Hunt <




Jean-Jacques Rousseau Stag Hunt 1754

		#2				
		Stag		Hare		
#1	Stag		3		2	
		3		0		
	Hare		0		2	
		2		2		



Jean-Jacques Rousseau Stag Hunt 1754



#### According to EvoGT:

Since most of our actual norms are often stable, they might be Pareto-inefficient unlike Contractarian norms.

#### **Achievements:**

- Explains the emergence & persistence of moral norms
- Has recovered many existing moral norms
- Provides an answer to "Why be moral?"

#### **Drawback:**

- Focus on explanation but not justifications
- Immoral norms!
- Moral skepticism

# Epilogue

This rather one-dimensional picture of rational man.



#### **Kreps & Wilson**

1982
Reputation and
Imperfect Information



"It has been said that man is a rational animal. All my life I have been searching for evidence which could support this."

#### Future work

Synthesis of the traditional Contractarian and the recent EvoGT approaches

# Questions?