CMPUT 654: Modelling Human Strategic Behaviour

Utility Theory

S&LB §3.1

Recap: Course Essentials

Course webpage: irwright.info/bgtcourse/

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for **private** questions (health problems, inquiries about grades)

Utility, informally

A utility function is a real-valued function that indicates how much an agent prefers an outcome.

Rational agents act to maximize their expected utility.

Nontrivial claim:

- represented by a **single number**?
- criterion?

Von-Neumann and Morgenstern's Theorem shows when these are true.

1. Why should we believe that an agent's preferences can be adequately

2. Why should agents maximize expected value rather than some other

Outline

- Informal statement 1.
- 2. Theorem statement (von Neumann & Morgenstern)
- 3. Proof sketch
- 4. Fun game!
- 5. Representation theorem (Savage)



Formal Setting: Outcome

Definition: Let *O* be a set of **outcomes**:

where Z is some set of "actual outcomes", and

 $\Delta(X)$ represents the set of **lotteries** over finite subsets of X:

 $[p_1 : x_1]$

with
$$\sum_{j=1}^{k} p_j = 1$$
 and $x_j \in X \quad \forall 1 \leq .$

 $O = Z \cup \Delta(O)$ Not a typo!

$$[,\ldots,p_k:x_k]$$

 $j \leq k$

Formal Setting: Preference Relation

A preference relation is a relationship between outcomes.

Definition

For a specific **preference relation** \geq , write:

- 1. $o_1 \geq o_2$ if the agent weakly prefers o_1 to o_2 ,
- 2. $o_1 > o_2$ if the agent strictly prefers o_1 to o_2 ,
- 3. $o_1 \sim o_2$ if the agent is **indifferent** between o_1 and o_2 .

Formal Setting

Definition

A utility function is a function $u: O \to \mathbb{R}$. A utility function **represents** a preference relation \geq iff:

1. $o_1 \geq o_2 \iff u(o_1) \geq u(o_2)$, and 2. $u([p_1:o_1,...,p_k:o_k]) = \sum_{k=1}^{k} p_j u(o_j).$

- i=1

Representation Theorem

Theorem: [von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944] Suppose that a preference relation \geq satisfies the axioms **Completeness**, Transitivity, Monotonicity, Substitutability, Decomposability, and Continuity.

Then there exists a function $u: O \to \mathbb{R}$ such that

I.
$$o_1 \geq o_2 \iff u(o_1) \geq u(o_2)$$
, and

2.
$$u([p_1:o_1,...,p_k:o_k]) = \sum_{j=1}^k p_j u_{j=1}$$

That is, there exists a utility function that represents \geq .

d

 $\mathcal{U}(O_i)$

Completeness and Transitivity

Definition (Completeness):

$$\forall o_1, o_2 : (o_1 \succ o_2)$$


Definition (Transitivity):

) $\lor (o_1 \prec o_2) \lor (o_1 \thicksim o_2)$

 $\forall o_1, o_2 : (o_1 \succeq o_2) \land (o_2 \succeq o_3) \implies o_1 \succeq o_3$

Transitivity Justification: Money Pump

- Suppose that $(o_1 > o_2)$ and $(o_2 > o_3)$ and $(o_3 > o_1)$.
- Starting from o_3 , you are willing to pay 1¢ (say) to switch to o_2
- But from o_2 , you should be willing to pay 1¢ to switch to o_1
- But from o_1 , you should be willing to pay 1¢ to switch back to o_3 again...



Monotonicity

Definition (Monotonicity): If $o_1 > o_2$ and p > q, then

You should prefer a 90% chance of getting \$1000 to a 50% chance of getting \$1000.

$[p:o_1,(1-p):o_2] > [q:o_1,(1-q):o_2].$

Substitutability

Definition (Substitutability): If $o_1 \sim o_2$, then for all sequences o_3, \ldots, o_k and p, p_3, \ldots, p_k with $p + \sum p_j = 1$, i=3

If I like apples and bananas equally, then I should be indifferent between a 30% chance of getting an apple and a 30% chance of getting a banana.

$[p:o_1, p_3: o_3, \dots, p_k: o_k] \sim [p:o_2, p_3: o_3, \dots, p_k: o_k]$

Decomposability aka "No Fun in Gambling"

Definition (Decomposability):

Let $P_{\ell}(o)$ denote the probability that lottery ℓ selects outcome o.

If
$$P_{\ell_1}(o_j) = P_{\ell_2}(o_j) \ \forall o_j \in O$$
, then ℓ

Example:

Let $\ell_1 = [0.5 : [0.5 : o_1, 0.5 : o_2], 0.5 : o_3]$ Let $\ell_2 = [0.25 : o_1, 0.25 : o_2, 0.5 : o_3]$

Then $\ell_1 \sim \ell_2$, because

 $\begin{aligned} P_{\ell_1}(o_1) &= 0.5 \times 0.5 = 0.25 &= P_{\ell_2}(o_1) \\ P_{\ell_1}(o_2) &= 0.5 \times 0.5 = 0.25 &= P_{\ell_2}(o_2) \\ P_{\ell_1}(o_3) &= 0.5 &= P_{\ell_2}(o_3) \end{aligned}$

 $\ell_1 \sim \ell_2.$

Continuity

Definition (Continuity):

If $o_1 > o_2 > o_3$, then $\exists p \in [0,1]$ such that

 $o_2 \sim [p:o_1,(1-p):o_3]$

Proof Sketch: Construct the utility function

every $o_1 > o_2 > o_3$, there exists some p such that:

(a)
$$o_2 \succ [q:o_1, (1-q):o_3]$$

(b)
$$o_2 \prec [q:o_1,(1-q):o_3]$$

2. If \geq additionally satisfies Continuity, then

$$\exists p: o_2 \sim [p:o_1,(1-p$$

Choose maximal $o^+ \in O$ and minimal $o^- \in O$. З.

4. Construct u(o) = p such that $o \sim [p:o^+, (1-p):o^-]$.

1. If \geq satisfies Completeness, Transitivity, Monotonicity, Decomposability, then for

] $\forall q < p$, and

] $\forall q > p$.

 $(o):o_3].$

Question: Are o^+ and $o^$ guaranteed to exist?

Proof sketch: Check the properties

1. $o_1 \geq o_2 \iff u(o_1) \geq u(o_2)$

u(o) = p such that $o \sim [p : o^+, (1 - p) : o^-].$

Proof sketch: Check the properties

2.
$$u([p_1:o_1,...,p_k:o_k]) = \sum_{j=1}^k p_j u(o_j)$$

- (i) Let $u^* = u([p_1 : o_1, ..., p_k : o_k])$

(ii) Replace
$$o_{j}$$
 with $\ell_{j} = [u(o_{j}) : o^{+}, (1 - u(o_{j})) : o^{-}]$, giving
 $[p_{1} : \ell_{1}, ..., p_{k} : \ell_{k}] = [p_{1} : [u(o_{1}) : o^{+}, (1 - u(o_{1})) : o^{-}], ..., p_{k} : [u(o_{k}) : o^{+}, (1 - u(o_{k})) : o^{-}]]$
(iii) Question: What is $u([p_{1} : \ell_{1}, ..., p_{k} : \ell_{k}])$?
(iv) Question: What is the probability of getting o^{+} in $[p_{1} : \ell_{1}, ..., p_{k} : \ell_{k}]$?
(iv) Question: What is the probability of getting o^{+} in $[p_{1} : \ell_{1}, ..., p_{k} : \ell_{k}]$?
(iv) Construct $\ell^{*} = \left[\sum_{j=1}^{k} \left(p_{j} \times u(o_{j})\right) : o^{+}, \left(1 - \sum_{j=1}^{k} \left(p_{i} \times u(o_{j})\right)\right) : o^{-}\right]$
 $u(\ell^{*}) = \sum_{j=1}^{k} \left(p_{j} \times u(o_{j})\right)$

(vi) Observe that $[p_1 : \ell_1, ..., p_k : \ell_k] \sim \ell^*$ (why?)

 $u([p_1:\ell_1,...,p_k:\ell_k]) = u^* = u(\ell^*) = \sum_{j=1}^k \left(p_j \times u(o_j) \right) \quad \blacksquare$

Caveats & Details

Utility functions are **not uniquely defined**. (Why?)

- Invariant to affine transformations (i.e., m > 0):
 - $\mathbb{E}[u(X)] \ge \mathbb{E}[u(Y)] \iff X \ge Y$ $\iff \mathbb{E}[mu(X) + b] \ge \mathbb{E}[mu(Y) + b] \iff X \ge Y$
- This means we're not stuck with a range of [0,1]!

Caveats & Details

- The proof depended on minimal and maximal elements of O, but that is not critical.
- Construction for **unbounded** outcomes/preferences:
 - 1. Pick two outcomes $o_s \prec o_e$. Construct utility for all outcomes $o_s \preceq o \preceq o_e$:
 - $u: \{o \in O \mid c$
 - 2. For outcomes o' outside that range, choose $o_{s'} < o' < o_s < o_e < o_{e'}$.
 - 3. Construct utility $u': \{o \in O \mid o_{s'} \leq o \leq o_{e'}\} \rightarrow [0,1].$

 - 5. Let u(o) = mu'(o) + b for all $o \in \{o' \in O \mid o_{s'} \leq o' \leq o_{e'}\}$.

$$o_s \leq o \leq o_e \} \rightarrow [0,1]$$

4. Find m > 0 and $b \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $mu'(o_s) + b = u(o_s)$ and $mu'(o_e) + b = u(o_e)$.

Fun game: Buying lottery tickets

Write down the following numbers:

- 1. How much would you pay for the lottery [0.3:\$5, 0.3:\$7, 0.4:\$9]?
- 2. How much would you pay for the lottery [p:\$5, q:\$7, (1 - p - q):\$9]?
- 3. How much would you pay for the lottery [p:\$5, q:\$7, (1 - p - q):\$9]if you knew the last seven draws had been 5,5,7,5,9,9,5?

Beyond

von Neumann & Morgenstern

- just learned.
 - **Question:** If two agents have different prices for functions for money?
- The second and third steps, not so much! lacksquare
 - **Question:** If two agents have different prices for ullet[p:\$5, q:\$7, (1 - p - q):\$9],what does that say about their **utility functions**?
 - once they hear what the last few draws were?

• The first step of the fun game was a good match to the utility theory we

[0.3: \$5, 0.3: \$7, 0.4: \$9], what does that say about their utility

What if two people have the same prices for step 2 but different prices

Another Formal Setting

- States: Set S of elements s, s', \ldots with subsets A, B, C, \ldots
- **Consequences**: Set F of elements f, g, h, \ldots
- Acts: Arbitrary functions $\mathbf{f}: S \to F$
- Preference relation ≥ between acts
- $(\mathbf{f} \succeq \mathbf{g} \text{ given } B) \iff$

 $\mathbf{f}' \geq \mathbf{g}'$ for every \mathbf{f}', \mathbf{g}' that agree with \mathbf{f}, \mathbf{g} respectively on B and each other on \overline{B}



Another Representation Theorem

Theorem: [Savage, 1954] Suppose that a preference relation \geq satisfies postulates P1-P6. Then there exists a utility function U and a probability measure Psuch that

 $\mathbf{f} \succeq \mathbf{g} \iff \sum P[B_i] U[f_i] \ge \sum P[B_i] U[g_i].$

Postulates

- \geq is a simple order **P1**
- $\forall \mathbf{f}, \mathbf{g}, B : (\mathbf{f} \geq \mathbf{g} \text{ given } B) \lor (\mathbf{g} \geq \mathbf{f} \text{ given } B)$ **P2**
- **P3**
- For every A, B, either $A \leq B$ or $B \leq A$ (see D4) **P4**
- It is false that for every $f, f', f \geq f'$. **P5**
- **P6** the ordering of the two acts.

$(\mathbf{f}(s) = g \land \mathbf{f}'(s) = g' \forall s \in B) \implies (\mathbf{f} \geq \mathbf{f}' \text{ given } B \iff g \geq g')$

For all $\mathbf{g} > \mathbf{h}$ and consequence f, there exists a partition of S such that the consequence of either \mathbf{g} or \mathbf{h} can be replaced by f without changing

Summary

- - \bullet certain set of **axioms**
 - theorem is about rational behaviour
- Can extend beyond this to "subjective" probabilities, using describe how agents manipulate probabilities.

• Using very simple axioms about preferences over lotteries, utility theory proves that rational agents ought to act as if they were maximizing the **expected value** of a real-valued function.

Rational agents are those whose behaviour satisfies a

• If you don't buy the axioms, then you shouldn't buy that this

axioms about preferences over uncertain "acts" that do not