Camerer & Ho (1999) Chen, Liu, Chen, and Lee (2011)

## Repeated Interactions

CMPUT 654: Modelling Human Strategic Behaviour

# Lecture Outline

#### 1. Camerer & Ho (1999)

2. Chen, Liu, Chen, and Lee (2011)

# Camerer & Ho (1999)

### Why:

Extremely influential model of repeated interactions

- Explain the motivation: Combining choice reinforcement 1. with **belief-based** learning
- 2. Describe the model (including how it generalizes choice reinforcement and belief-based learning)
- 3. Some empirical results (parameter fits, performance)

# Belief-Based Learning

Paradigmatic version is fictitious play [Robinson 1951]:

- 1. Estimate strategy of op
- 2. Best respond to  $\hat{s}_{-i}$
- Takes no account of payoffs of other agent
- Requires access to all of own counterfactual payoffs lacksquare

ponent as 
$$\hat{s}_{-i}(a_{-i}) = \frac{w(a_{-i})}{\sum_{a'_{-i} \in A_{-i}} w(a'_{-i})}$$

# Choice-Reinforcement Learning

- Each action has an associated reinforcement  $R(a_i,t)$
- Reinforcements on chosen actions update based on realized payoffs (where  $0 \le \phi \le 1$ ):

$$R(a_i, t) = \begin{cases} \phi \cdot R(a_i, t-1) + u_i(a_i, a_{-i}(t)) & \text{if } a_i(t) = a_i, \\ \phi \cdot R(a_i, t-1) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

### Experience-Weighted Attraction

• Action probability is monotonic in **attractions**  $A(a_i,t)$ :



Attractions updated according to

$$A(a_i, t) = \frac{\phi \cdot N(t-1) \cdot A(a_i, t-1)}{2}$$

where

 $s_i(a_i, t) = \frac{\exp[\lambda A(a_i, t)]}{\sum_{a_i \in A_i} \exp[\lambda A(a_i', t)]}$ 

) +  $[\delta + (1 - \delta) \cdot I[a_i = a_i(t)]] \cdot u_i(a_i, a_{-i}(t))$ N(t)

 $N(t) = \rho \cdot N(t-1) + 1$ 

## Differences from Belief-Based Learning

- Initial attractions can be **arbitrary**
- Attractions can grow outside bounds of payoffs

# Empirical Results

- Actually do an out-ofsample check!
- EWA and belief-based perform best on this data
- Stylized behaviour in beauty contests:
  - 1. Dispersed initial play
  - 2. Rapid convergence to equilibrium

Game Model

Median Action (M

- 1-Segment
- Random Choice
- Choice Reinford
- Belief-based
- EWA
- 2-Segment Random Choice Reinford Belief-based
  - EWA
- p-beauty contests
- 1-Segment Random Choice Reinford Belief-based
- EWA
- 2-Segment Random Choice Reinford
  - Belief-based
  - EWA

|            | No. of     | Calibration |                      |           | Validation |           |         |
|------------|------------|-------------|----------------------|-----------|------------|-----------|---------|
|            | Parameters | LL          | AIC                  | BIC       | $\rho^2$   | LL        | MSD     |
| 1 = 378)   |            |             |                      |           |            |           |         |
| e          | 0          | -677.29     | -677.29              | -677.29   | 0.0000     | -315.24   | 0.1217  |
| cement     | 8          | -341.70     | -349.70              | -365.44   | 0.4837     | -80.27    | 0.0301  |
|            | 9          | -438.74     | -447.74              | -465.45   | 0.3389     | -113.90   | 0.0519  |
|            | 11         | -309.30     | -320.30              | -341.94*  | 0.5271     | -41.05    | 0.0185  |
|            |            |             |                      |           |            |           |         |
|            | 0          | -677.29     | -677.29              | -677.29   | 0.0000     | -315.24   | 0.1217  |
| cement     | 17         | -331.25     | -348.25              | -381.70   | 0.4858     | -66.32    | 0.0245  |
|            | 19         | -379.24     | -398.24              | -435.62   | 0.4120     | -70.31    | 0.0250  |
|            | 23         | -290.25     | -313.25*             | -358.51   | 0.5375     | -34.79*   | 0.0139* |
| (M = 1372) |            |             |                      |           |            |           |         |
|            |            |             |                      |           |            |           |         |
|            | 0          | -6318.29    | -6318.29             | -6318.29  | 0.0000     | -2707.84  | 0.0099  |
| cement     | 12         | -5910.99    | - 5922.99            | -5954.33  | 0.0626     | -2594.37  | 0.0101  |
|            | 13         | -6083.04    | - 6096.04            | -6129.99  | 0.0352     | -2554.21  | 0.0097  |
|            | 15         | -5878.20    | -5893.20             | -5932.38  | 0.0673     | -2381.28  | 0.0098  |
|            | 0          | 6210 20     | 6210 20              | 6210 20   | 0.0000     | 7707 01   | 0.0000  |
|            | 0          | -0318.29    | - 0318.29            | -0318.29  | 0.0000     | -2/0/.84  | 0.0099  |
| cement     | 25<br>27   | - 3910.98   | - 3733.98<br>6110.02 | -0001.28  | 0.0005     | -2394.17  | 0.0101  |
|            | ۲/<br>21   | -0083.02    | -0110.02             | -0180.34  | 0.0016     | - 2004.11 | 0.009/* |
|            | 31         | -3//1.40    | -3802.40*            | -3883.43* | 0.0810     | -2555.00* | 0.0098  |

# Chen, Liu, Chen, and Lee (2011)

### Why: Recent, high-performing behavioural model

- Define the model 1.
- 2. Empirical results

# Market Entry Games

- Binary choice whether to enter a risky market
- Entry payoff is
- $V(t) = 10 k \times E + G_t$
- where  $G_t$  is randomly L < 0 or H > 0, with  $\mathbb{E}[G_t] = 0$
- Not entering yields  $G_t / s$  or  $-G_t / s$  with equal probability

# Model: I-SAW

- Agents are in one of three **modes**: explore, inertia, exploit
  - explore mode: choose from some fixed distribution
  - inertia mode: choose the same action as last time
  - exploit mode: choose action with highest expected subjective value:

- Fixed probability  $\varepsilon$  of entering explore mode; else, enter inertia mode with high probability when surprise is low
- $ESV(a_i) = (1 w)(SampleM(a_i, t)) + w(GrandM(a_i, t))$

differently (only draws from *b* most recent games)

## BI-SAW

Exactly the same as I-SAW, except that SampleM is defined

### Simulation:

- Parameters chosen for each individual
- Chosen uniformly from a range
  - Lower bound fixed, upper bound learned ullet
- 5000 trajectories sampled from the game, error is averaged

#### **Estimation:**

• Grid search on upper bounds!

## Simulation & Estimation